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Africa  has  become  the  most  targeted  continent  for large-scale  agricultural  land investments  (LALIs)  with
over 60%  of the  global  ﬁgure.  Some  efforts  have  been  made  to  investigate  the  determinants  of LALIs  at  the
global  level;  however,  scare  evidence  abounds  regarding  the  characteristics  of target  communities  in a
given  country  particularly  in  Nigeria,  one  of  the top 20  recipients  of LALIs  globally.  This  study  contributes
by  showing  how  community  characteristics  inﬂuence  the  likelihood  of  receiving  LALIs  and  the  aspectsgriculture
ommunities
nstitutions
and deals
ural areas
of  such  community  characteristics  that  matter.  Utilising  community-level  data  in Nigeria  and  estimating
with  probit  model,  some  ﬁndings  are  made.  Unexpectedly,  the indicators  of  local  institutions  in  the
communities  do not  exert  signiﬁcant  inﬂuence  on  the  likelihood  of  LALIs  occurrence.  This  supposes  that
the  local  institutions  are  rather  overwhelmed  by  the  state.  How  the  local  institutions  can be  integrated
for  LALIs are  suggested.
© 2014  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  All  rights  reserved.ntroduction
The issue of large-scale agricultural land investments (LALIs) in
frica has been attributed to the supposed availability of cheap land
oupled with weak land governance. This, inter alia, has made Africa
he most targeted region with over 60% of global foreign land deals
Brüntrup, 2011; Deininger et al., 2011; Osabuohien et al., 2013).
eininger et al. (2011) observed that out of 464 land projects, 203
ncluded area information that summed up to 56.6 million hectares
ha) cutting across projects in 81 countries; 48% of these projects
overed 39.7 million ha, representing about two-third were in Sub-
aharan Africa (SSA). Similarly, out of the 1217 publicly reported
and deals, 62% of them covering a total area of 56.2 million ha are
n Africa (Anseeuw et al., 2012a).
LALIs can be described as the purchase or lease of land by indi-
iduals and entities outside their country of origin. Some refer to
ALIs as ‘land grabbing’ to depict its negative side (Cotula et al.,
009; FIAN, 2010; Brüntrup, 2011). FIAN (2010: p. 8) deﬁned it as
he “taking possession of and/or controlling a scale of land for com-
ercial/industrial agricultural production that is disproportionate
n size in comparison to the average land holding in a region”. The
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ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.02.019
264-8377/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.major reasons for the increasing recent reports of LALIs include:
boom for bio-fuel policies across the world; rising food prices (cri-
sis) in the world market; and the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007/2008
that caused investors to seek alternative sources of investment with
a view to reducing the effects of ﬁnancial market volatility. Others
are: the increasing oil price and the sale of certiﬁcate for reducing
emissions (Cotula et al., 2009; Deininger et al., 2011; Cotula, 2012).
Some research efforts have been made to investigate the deter-
minants of LALIs at the global level. These studies have identiﬁed
a number of main drivers of LALIs including: global ﬁnancial crises,
bio-fuel policies, rising food prices, and so on (Cotula et al., 2009;
Arezki et al., 2011; Brüntrup, 2011; Deininger et al., 2011; Anseeuw
et al., 2012a). Nevertheless, little is known regarding the character-
istics of target communities in a given country. The characteristics
of the target localities (e.g. the availability of land, current land use
patterns and population densities), can shape the socio-economic
outcomes of LALIs. This can result to “land grabs” with negative
implications for affected local populations or positive impact on
the socio-economic development of the host communities (Nolte,
2014).
This study provides empirical evidence on the community-level
determinants of LALIs in Nigeria, an important receptor of LALIs.1
1 The domestic land acquisitions are also important; however, this study is mainly
concerned with foreign aspect as information regarding domestic acquisitions is
scarcely available.
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hus, the main research questions are: despite the same land policy
cross the States in Nigeria (as enshrined in the Land Use Act), why
o LALIs vary substantially across communities; and how do local
nstitutions at the community-level inﬂuence LALIs in Nigeria? The
ext section is the conceptual framework followed by description
f data and the method of analysis. The results, main ﬁndings and
onclusion follow subsequently.
arge-scale agricultural land investments and institutions
The occurrence of large-scale agricultural land investments
LALIs) can be related to the nature of institutional framework
s land deals, in particular, and land governance, in general, will
epend to a considerable extent on the prevailing institutional
uality in a country. The issue of legal and institutional frame-
ork associated with LALIs is important given the increasing role
f institutions in managing economic activities and decision mak-
ng process. The nature of institutional framework in a country can
reate choices that can affect transactions and production costs. It
lays out in the formulation of policies in an economy that will be
elevant for securing property rights and general shaping of rela-
ionships among economic agents (North, 1991; Williamson, 2000;
cemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Nye, 2011; Osabouhien and Efobi,
013).
The negotiation process and the level of consultations in land
eals will be determined, to a large extent, by those in author-
ty in the host countries, which can be in alliance with the local
ommunity leaders or not. Sometimes, the position to be eventu-
lly chosen in the negotiation process will be inﬂuenced by the
xtent of returns that the prospective investors can anticipate as
ell as the ofﬁcials representing the State (Government).2 It is
ot very surprising that land investors tend to focus mainly on
ountries that have a weak institutional framework to maximise
heir returns on investments (Arezki et al., 2011; Deininger et al.,
011; Oxfam, 2013). In this light, Nolte (2014) using evidence from
ambia posits that LALIs can exhibit different aspects of land grabs
nd development opportunities, depending on how the actors (host
ommunities and investors) play the game. The rule of the game as
eferred by the author relates to land governance including the for-
al  rules, informal norms, and the process of enforcement of rules
n land administration.
Anseeuw et al. (2012b) observe how the quality of governance
an aspect of institutions) can lead to adverse implications stem-
ing from LALIs. In this perspective, weak democratisation, poor
ccountability and transparency will contribute to the power of
olitical elites capturing and allocating acreage of lands ‘at will’.
he existence of weak legal system (e.g. poor legal structure)
ill result in poor property right protection and dispossession of
and holdings. This study presents a conceptual framework depict-
ng the role of institutions in determining LALIs as illustrated in
ig. 1.
It is worth noting that institutions can be categorised into tra-
itional (or informal) and formal. This is in congruence with North
1991, 2005)’s categorisation of formal and informal institutions
ith formal characterised by written-down and well-documented
rinciples that guide the affairs of a society. While the traditional
simply called local institutions here) entail unwritten moral
odes, values and conducts that inﬂuences how a people (e.g.
2 Corruption can inﬂuence the process as some public ofﬁcials can be bought over
o  play down on the due process. In large-scale land deals, environmental impact
ssessment is supposed to be carried out, but when the public ofﬁcers are corrupt;
his  requirement can be undermined or shabbily done. How corruption occurs and
atters for LALIs is sufﬁcient for another research.licy 39 (2014) 155–165
community, association) is organised (North, 2005; Osabouhien
and Efobi, 2013).
The formal institution regarding land deals in Nigeria is docu-
mented in the land policy captioned the Land Use Act of 1978. The
Act entrusts on the government (at the States) the custodian right
to issue certiﬁcates of occupancy for land holders within their ter-
ritories (Mabogunje, 2010; Adeniyi, 2011). Thus, it can be said to
be the same across the 36 States in Nigeria and the Federal Capital
Territory-Abuja. As can be seen in Fig. 1, the government through
its agencies (the Land Committee and ministries related to land)
working within the embodiment of the legal rules of the country
and in accordance to the Land Use Act have direct contact with the
potential land investors. The outcomes that emanate from the con-
tact based on the negotiations and the agreement to be reached
will depend on both the quality of the rules and those of the public
ofﬁcers.
The local institutions comprise the community leaders who
can act on behalf of the members of the community. The com-
munity leaders can be seen as the embodiment and custodian
of the customs, beliefs, norms and values in the community and
this can vary across communities. For example, in some com-
munities, the head of the community is the oldest man, while
in some (where the hereditary system operates) the ﬁrst son of
the King and Chief takes over after the death of the father. The
focus here is on informal institutions, which has not received much
emphasise in extant works. Thus, variations in different communi-
ties within and between States in Nigeria will then be considered
under the purview of local institutional system in addition to
other community factors. If the community leaders are powerful
and not self-seeking they can defend the interest of the members
of the community.3 This will be based on the electoral strength,
which may  be a good bargaining power for voting during elections.
Hence, it is not unusual to see political aspirants holding meetings
with community leaders to solicit for their votes and those of the
households in the community. It is the same power that could be
utilised by the community leaders to inﬂuence the negotiations for
LALIs.
In the event of LALIs, the investors can opt for a given location
of land after getting some clearance from the State Government.
The members of the community that occupy the land may  not
have the capacity (technical, information, resources) for the nego-
tiation process and can rely on their community leaders. These
community leaders convey the desires of the members to the
potential investors. They can also act on the bidding of the State
Government like in the case of Kwara State (Ariyo and Mortimore,
2012). Thus, there is a weak connection between the local insti-
tutions and potential investors as denoted by thin-dashed arrow
in Fig. 1. In many developing countries, land titles are poorly
deﬁned (Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Bromley, 2009). Many in the
communities do not own  titles for their land and as result the
discretion and negotiation of the Government and investor hold
sway as the Land Use Act has empowered the State Govern-
ment.
Unlike the formal institutions, how the local institutions interact
with LALIs is not clear in the literature. Local institutions do not
have much legal power and recognition regarding contending with
the power of the state on issues that matter to the community. In
Fig. 1, this is represented by the curved-thin arrow with question
mark. Similarly, the kind of contact between traditional leaders and
potential land investors is not clear. Other community features such
3 There is the possibility of community leaders getting corrupt. In this case, there
will  be inadequate community consultation, which will weaken the local institu-
tions.
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The main insight from this short historical perspective is that
neglecting the peculiarities and signiﬁcance of local institutionsFig. 1. The con
s the area, population, infrastructure, and the leaders’ capacity can
ave some roles to play in inﬂuencing LALIs.4
Taking a swift leap into history will provide some useful insights
nto how the undermining of the local institutions on the issue
f land acquisition, project development and execution can lead
o consequences such as abandoned projects and below expecta-
ions delivery of development project. Baldwin (1957) and Kohnert
1979, 1986) give some lessons from Nigeria using the Niger Agri-
ultural Development Project in Mokwa  District (Niger State). The
cheme had resettlement plans (just like LALIs should have, among
thers). Despite the large investment of funds, the scheme failed in
any respects chieﬂy due to the fact that the implementers (forces
rom above)  did not take into cognisance the concerns of the host
ommunities (voices from below).
The successor of the Niger Agricultural Development Project,
he Mokwa Cattle Ranch, a development project based on bilateral
rrangements between the Nigerian and German Governments,
as established in 1964 and handed over to Niger State Gov-
rnment in 1974. It failed and the ranch ﬁnally closed in 2004
fter many years of ailment (Okaiyeto and Abubakar, 2006). Some
f the causes of the failure were the obsolescence of plants and
4 Other factors such as quality of land (soil fertility, ability to mechanise), close-
ess to markets are also relevant; however, information on them is not available in
he data.al framework.
machineries as well as negative macroeconomic shocks. Another
factor, possibly most crucial, was poor managerial capacities, as
the management that took over from the Germans was  appointed
by the government without due consideration to qualiﬁcations
and to the felt needs of the local communities.
The World Bank assisted to recover the project area through
large-scale agricultural development schemes (maize farming)
within the Bida Agricultural Development Project. It was designed
to beneﬁt about 60,000 farmers that are located in the southern
parts of Niger State, which failed again (World Bank, 1988). In
fact, the ﬁrst concern was the understanding of the real constraints
limiting farmers’ production. The major reason of failure was  the
hubris of Western development experts and their transfer of tech-
nology approach that disregarded local conditions as well as the
needs, views, resources and agricultural practice of local farmers at
the grassroots.will not deliver the expected outcomes from LALIs.5. In other words,
5 As highlighted in the triangle with broken lines at the end of Fig. 1, the list of the
LALIs outcomes and implications include: effects on the size of farmlands; changes
in  livelihood strategies; effects on food prices; markets creation versus diversion;
spill-over effects in terms of technological transfer; employment opportunities; and
environmental issues. The nature and extent of these implications will depend on
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ALIs that will follow the integration of local institutions will have
etter outcomes as the community will not see the investors as total
liens or government stooges. In essence, it will be in the interest
f not only the host communities but also of the government and
he investors. This is important as frequent conﬂicts between the
ost communities and the land investors are commonly reported.
n many cases, the government used the temporary tool of armed
orces to quell the crises, which resurface after a short time. In few
ther cases investors have abandoned their project due to persis-
ent conﬂicts. Instances of conﬂicts relating to land deals have been
eported in Cambodia, Honduras, Mozambique (Oxfam, 2012), Côte
’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda (Van Der
wan, 2013), and so on.
ata and method of analysis
he data
The study engages quantitative data using two main sources,
amely: the Land Matrix and the Living Standards Measure-
ent Study-Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS ISA). The
and Matrix gives information on the locations (Local Govern-
ent Areas-LGAs) in Nigeria where LALIs occur. The new version
Beta Version 2) of the Land Matrix Database was launched 10th
une, 2013 (Land Matrix, 2013). The Land Matrix dataset docu-
ents potential and enacted land transactions and deals across
he world with information on the location of LALIs as well as
he intended size and contract size. Details on the investors, ori-
in, destination, activities and total deals are also included on
and Matrix Database (Land Matrix, 2013). The recent paper by
nseeuw et al. (2013) gives a handy summary of the data covered
nd scope of Land Matrix, which sheds some light to the con-
erns raised on the reliability of the data (Scoones et al., 2013; Oya,
013).
The LSMS ISA was conducted by the World Bank in collabo-
ation with Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics.6 The dataset
rom LSMS ISA covers the 36 States in Nigeria including Abuja.7
he data are classiﬁed into three groups: agriculture, households
nd community for the two waves of the survey (post-planting and
ost-harvest). For the purpose of this study, the community-level
ata is utilised involving the merging of both the post-planting and
ost-harvest data as the variables of interest are in either of the two.
he post-planting interview was carried out August–October, 2010,
hile the post-harvest was  conducted February–April, 2011. There
re 500 Enumeration Areas (EAs) sampled from the total of 774
GAs in Nigeria covering the urban and rural areas in the 36 States
f Nigeria plus Abuja. An EA is a component of the LGA. Nigeria
uns three tiers of government: Federal, States and Local. The data
s aggregated at the LGA-level as information on LALIs from Land
atrix provides location at LGA. This is also besides the fact that
GA is the tier of government that is believed to be closest to the
rassroots. In all, there are over 400 LGAs in the study. Thus, for
he purpose of this study a community is almost synonymous as
actors like terms of the agreement, the kind of activities engaged by the investors,
nd so on, which can be taken up in another study.
6 The dataset, structured questionnaires, manuals and codebook are avail-
ble online (http://go.worldbank.org/7WAX56IJP0). Besides Nigeria, other African
ountries covered by the LSMS ISA include: Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Tanzania,
nd Uganda.
7 Political sensitivity of data such as controversy on politically biased population
ensuses in Nigeria may  be raised (e.g. Devarajan, 2013). However, the LSMS ISA is
ess tensed and will not attract such political interest like census because census ﬁg-
res can be used to inﬂuence resource allocations amongst the tiers of government.licy 39 (2014) 155–165
LGA.8 The good thing about the LSMS ISA data is that information
about the location (LGA and EA) is unique in both the post-planting
and post-harvest data ﬁles. The response to the community
questionnaire is provided in a kind of key informant interview
done in groups with each group comprising at least ﬁve persons
(e.g. community leaders) that have sufﬁcient knowledge of the
community.
The empirical model
The empirical model is formulated with a view to providing
evidence on factors that determine the occurrence of LALIs in a
community. This is given the understanding that studies (e.g. Arezki
et al., 2011; Cotula, 2012; Oxfam, 2013) have noted at the global
level that availability of land and weak institutions are the main
drivers of LALIs in developing countries. The interest of this study
is on within country factors. In other words, given that LALI is good,
what factors will make community i to attract it, and if LALIs sug-
gests cost to the community what factors will make community
i not to be targeted or to resist it. Thus, the model to underscore
how community characteristics inﬂuence the likelihood of LALIs is
formulated as:
Pr(LALIi = 1) = ˚(˛0 + ˛1Xi + ˛2Zi + ei) (1)
LALI: The occurrence of LALIs in community i or not. The data
from Land Matrix is used to construct this variable by categorisation
of the communities.
Xi: Set of community characteristics. These include indicators
of modern infrastructure (measured as the availability of mod-
ern means of transportation (transpdum), local institutions proxied
by presence non-state actors (NSAs); activities of non-state actors
(meetfreq); information on women  access to land (womenaces).9
Other variables include: the educational attainment of the com-
munity leaders (educ post). These variables are obtained from
LSMS ISA.
Zi: Other control variables such as the total area of the com-
munity (area) in square kilometre (‘000 sq km)  and population of
the community in thousand persons (popu); area and popu are
continuous variables and are obtained from the Nigeria’s National
Population Commission (NPC). Given the security issues that has
rocked the Nigerian state in recent years, a continuous variable for
security captured by the average number of violent death in the
communities between 2006 and 2011 (security avg) sourced from
Nigeria Watch (2012) was added to investigate if it matters for LALIs
or not. The type of vegetation and geographical location proxied by
the amount of rainfall in 2011 (rainfall) was also examined. This is
obtained from United Nations Institute for Training and Research –
UNITAR (2011).
Deﬁnition of variables and expected signsLALI: The dependent variable that indicates the occurrence of
LALIs in a community. It is a categorical variable that takes 1 for
community ‘i’ that has LALI, and 0 if not.
8 It may  not be totally representative of the communities in Nigeria due to diverse
ethnic inclination; it however, provides useful insights on the characteristics of
Nigerian communities.
9 Another indicator of local institutions that would have been of interest is the
connection between the community leaders and the State Government (Governor)
or  from the same ethnic and religious background. However, such information is
not available. An index for local institutions was created using Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) by adding whether the community is able to determine indepen-
dently the rule of access and use of its communal resource or not and the recognition
of communal resource by the traditional authorities to NSAs and meetfreq.
se Policy 39 (2014) 155–165 159
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Transpdum: The proxy for availability of modern means of
ransportation in the community. This was constructed from the
eans of transportation that is mostly used in the community. The
ichotomisation was made by classifying presence of modern com-
ercial transportation inclusive of bus or minibus, taxi and boat
s 1 and 0, if otherwise.10 The expectation is that better means
f transportation should reduce cost of transportation (including
ime) and production. Thus, positive sign is expected.
NSAs: Is an indication of the presence of Non-state actors and
ommunity organisations such as village development commit-
ee, agricultural cooperative, savings and credit cooperatives, and
ther non-governmental organisations-NGOs. When these NSAs
re available, it is denoted as 1, and 0 if otherwise. NSAs have been
nown to play role in sensitising communities on rumours of LALIs
efore the deals are concluded (Grain, 2013). In the case of Malawi,
umbe and Angelsen (2006) have observed that village-level organi-
ations can help in managing resource and assist in reducing natural
esource degradation. Therefore, negative sign is expected.
Meetfreq: Captures the frequency of meeting of the largest NSAs
s the presence may  not matter much but their activities. It was
onstructed by denoting weekly, monthly and quarterly meetings
s 1, and 0 if only once or twice a year. Just like NSAs, Meetfreq is
xpected to be negative. NSAs and Meetfreq are used alternatively
s informed by a correlation test (not reported).11
Womenaces: Measures the extent to which women  in the
ommunity have access to land, which is an indication of land acces-
ibility as women in most Nigerian society usually do not have land
ccess given the patrilineal system to property inheritance includ-
ng land. Peters (2013) commenting on the land policy of Malawi
otes reasons for incessant unequal inheritance by male and female
hildren as due to difference in deﬁning types of women and gen-
ered statuses of women. This variable is categorised as 1 if women
ave access to land for cultivation, and 0 if otherwise. Negative sign
s expected just like NSAs and Meetfreq.
Educ post: Measures the level of educational attainment in
he community represented by community leaders. It derived by
aking 1 if the community leaders have at least post-primary
ducation and above; and 0 if less than post-primary education.
iven that education empowers people, it should be expected that
ommunities with more educated leaders will demand adequate
ompensation regarding LALIs, which means more sunk cost to
nvestors. Thus, negative sign is expected.
Area: Is the size of the community land mass (in ‘000 sq km).
rom the resource-seeking argument (Deininger et al., 2011;
otula, 2012), communities with large expanse of land will likely
e targeted by LALIs; hence, positive sign is expected.
Population: Is the population of the community in thousand per-
ons. The expected sign is negative as they will mount domestic
ressure on the use of land. However, if population is seen as means
f providing labour for agricultural activities (in rural areas), the
ign can be positive. The sign is not clear a priori.
Density: Population density derived by dividing population by
rea (mainly introduced for robustness check). Negative sign is
xpected as sparsely populated community will have less pressure
n land.
Security avg: Shows the possible security challenge in a com-
unity as measured by the average number of violent death in
10 In the dataset (LSMS ISA) the reported means of transportation include: walking,
ule/donkey, bicycle, car/motorcycle, bus/mini-bus, taxi, and boat; and one or more
f  them are used in Nigerian communities.
11 The correlation test also conﬁrms that there is no issue of multi-collinearrity
mong the independent variables. The issue of endogeneity like getting valid instru-
ents for the indicators of local institutions and lagging the variables can be done in
ollow-up study particularly when examining the implications of LALIs, which will
e possible when more versions (waves) of LSMS ISA for Nigeria become available.Abia Anambra Edo Ekiti Katsina Kwara Rivers
Fig. 2. Reported land deals (intended size in hectares – ha) in Nigeria.
the communities between 2006 and 2011. The expected sign is
negative on the premise that security challenges will affect LALIs
inversely.
Rainfall: Gives an indication on the type of vegetation and geo-
graphical location. This is proxied by the amount of rainfall in 2011.
Typically the vegetation cover in Nigeria, which is determined by
rainfall distribution falls into two broad belts of vegetation types
(forest and savannah). A breakdown of vegetation types in Nigeria
starting from the coastal region to the north include: saline water
swamp, freshwater swamp, tropical evergreen rainforest, guinea
savannah, the mountain vegetation, sudan savannah, and sahel
savannah. It is expected that locations with reasonable amount of
rainfall will be more suitable for agricultural activities, and as such
a positive sign is expected.
The model is estimated using logistic regression technique
based on probit model as the dependent variable is a categorical. All
the sampled communities are ﬁrst estimated and estimation using
sub-sample for only rural communities is carried out to take into
account the distinctive feature of rural communities.
Empirical evidences and discussion
The extent of large-scale agricultural land investments-LALIs in
Nigeria
In the Beta Version 2 of the Land Matrix, there is distinction
between concluded deals (indicating contract size) and reported
deals (with intended size). The distinction does not matter much
for the current paper because emphasis is on how community char-
acteristics inﬂuence the likelihood of a community receiving LALIs
or not. In this wise, the tendency for such to occur or not in a given
location is of essence – the display of interest and demand for land
in a community (Anseeuw et al., 2013).
An examination of the land deals as presented in Fig. 2 bring
to the fore that LALI in Nigeria concentrates in few very States.
This is an indication of enormous variation regarding the LALIs in
African countries like Nigeria. It might also have resulted from the
fact that these are the States where such LALI occurrence is widely
reported and documented due to the secrecy that shrouds LALIs
(Anseeuw et al., 2013; Oya, 2013). For instance, in all the deals
reported for Nigeria, to the best knowledge of this researcher, only
the one that occurred in Shonga (Tsonga in Nupe dialect) of Kwara
State have received academic commentary (e.g. Mustapha, 2011;
Ariyo and Mortimore, 2011, 2012; Olawepo, 2012). This attention
stemmed from the wide media report regarding the negotiation
and acquisition process as the Kwara State Government (led by the
then Governor ‘Bukola Saraki) was interestedly involved.The variation may  also result from the fact that only the States
where the basic information criteria of the Land Matrix are ful-
ﬁlled. Aside from that, in the respective States concentration is also
observed. For instance in Kwara State, there are about 15 reported
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eals across communities while two are reported in Ekiti State. In
he public interface of the Land Matrix, there are 23 deals reported
or Nigeria based on the criteria (e.g. minimum of 200 ha). How-
ver, in the internal database there are 44 reported deals with some
aving smaller size such as 20 and 50 ha in Patigi and Edu LGAs,
espectively of Kwara State.12
In addition, the land deals in Land Matrix comprise investment
cross various sectors such as agriculture, mining and industry
s main intentions of the investors.13 About 90% of the cases in
igeria are intended for agricultural purpose, comprising: food
rops, livestock, and non-food agricultural crops-agrofuels. This
tudy focused only on those that are related to agricultural sec-
or as it has been seen to be essential for developing countries
Oya, 2009). The above choice is also based on the understand-
ng that more than 70% of the population especially in the rural
reas is employed in the agricultural sector in Nigeria (National
ureau of Statistics, 2010; Olawepo, 2012). The basic summary
rom this sub-section is that despite the fact that only LALIs in
wara State is publicised, there are intentions, negotiations and
perations of LALIs occurring in other locations in Nigeria. Another
s that the LALIs tend to concentrate in a handful of States in
igeria.
ummary statistics of selected variables
This sub-section presents basic summary statistics on the main
ariables in the empirical model. The mean and the standard
eviation across all the sampled communities as well as only com-
unities with LALIs and those without LALIs are presented and brief
omparisons made between them. These are reported in Table 1 and
able A1 (in the Appendix).
The mean values indicate that the existence of some observ-
ble differences between communities that have experienced the
ccurrence of LALIs and those that do not. Using how far it takes
n the average to access the location of social amenities (such
s banks, police station, post-primary education centre, hospital),
ommunities with LALIs have lower values, indicating better infra-
tructure. In effect, the distance in communities without LALIs is
lmost double those with LALIs (see Table A1). This is in align-
ent with common wisdom as better infrastructure will reduce
ost of transporting farm inputs to location and farm produce to
arket. A similar analogy is the fact that both cost of land and
abour are cheaper in communities with LALIs. Whereas it costs
3,940 naira to purchase an acre of land and 3670 naira to hire
abourers to work on an acre of land in communities with LALIs,
t costs 361,640 naira and 3916 naira in communities without
ALIs. The possible connotation of this is that LALIs will likely occur
ore in communities that have cheaper land as well as cheaper
abour.
As can be observed in Table 1, the size of the area and pop-
lation in communities with LALIs tend to be higher than those
ithout LALI. In communities with LALIs the average size is about
911 sq km with an average population of 224,240 persons but
ommunities without LALI have average size of 1174 sq km and
opulation of 200,660 persons. The value for density informs
hat LALIs communities have lower population density with the
verage of 981 persons per sq km compared to those of non-LALIs
ith the average value of 1046 persons per sq km.  This seems to
uggest the possible resource (land and labour-population) seeking
12 I thank the GIGA partner of the Land Matrix for supplying data from the internal
atabase during my  fellowship period.
13 Apart from the ‘White Zimbabwean farmers’, others are from Belgium, China,
rance, India, Italy, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, United Sates
f  America, and Vietnam.licy 39 (2014) 155–165
tendency of LALIs. A glance at other variables reveals that though
communities with LALIs tend to have little more existence of NSAs
but it has less women access to land than those communities
without LALIs. The amount of rainfall was  higher in commu-
nities that have LALIs presence with the value of 235.00 mm
than that of communities without LALIs with the value of
214.95 mm.
Regression results
The regression results were carried out both for the entire sam-
ple and for rural communities sub-sample but only results for the
rural communities are presented and discussed. This was informed
by the understanding that land may  be more available in rural
areas for LALIs than urban areas due to other competing uses (e.g.
residential and industrial purposes).
As reported in Table 2, the estimation in Column A is used as the
baseline model involving the area, population and an indicator for
infrastructure (transpdum) as the main independent variables. In
Table A2 (in the Appendix), population density was used instead of
the disaggregated component of area and population with a view
to accessing if the population density in a community matters in
inﬂuencing LALIs.
The indication of infrastructure had the expected positive sign
in the speciﬁcations of Table 2, suggesting that LALIs will likely go to
areas with better infrastructure but the variable was not signiﬁcant
at 10%. This may  mean that there is not much difference in rural
areas in terms of infrastructure, which implies that infrastructure
does not play signiﬁcant role for a community attracting LALIs or
not particularly those that are related to agricultural investments.
Another important ﬁnding is that area of the community exerts
consistent positive and signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the likelihood of
LALIs occurring in a community. This conﬁrms the resource seeking
argument that communities with large size will be more likely to
attract LALI. It also supports basic intuition that communities that
have large area will have more acreage of land that can be leased
or purchased for the purpose of LALIs.
On the other hand, population of the community has negative
sign in all the speciﬁcations and is equally signiﬁcant. The reason
for the negative sign can emanate from the intuition that communi-
ties with large population already have domestic pressure for land
and as a result may  not likely attract LALIs. Thus, one can state
that the greater the population density of the communities, the
less likely it will be juicy for the attraction of LALIs. Putting this
differently, the smaller the population density of a community, the
more likely it will play recipient to LALIs, ceteris paribus. Using the
case of Nupeland in Northern Nigeria, Kohnert (1979) has made a
related argument.
The above argument becomes clearer when one takes a glance
at Table A2 (in the Appendix) where population density is used
in the speciﬁcations directly. The coefﬁcient of population density
had consistent negative signs in all the regressions and signiﬁcant
in a number of them. The connotation of this ﬁnding is that pop-
ulation density of a community inﬂuences the attraction of LALIs
inversely. This is not far from reality as communities with high pop-
ulation density will have domestic pressures for land, which will
make LALIs unattractive as the domestic pressure can create room
for resistance to LALIs. Ansoms (2010) have mentioned a similar
observation using the case of local populations in rural Rwanda.
One rather surprising ﬁnding from the results is that the variable
security came with positive sign in all the speciﬁcations contrary to
the expected negative sign. Though it does not have much signiﬁ-
cant inﬂuence, the results suggest that the security level of Nigeria’s
communities do not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the attraction of LALIs.
This may  also be the fact that LALIs in Nigeria do not occur much in
some security challenged areas of Niger Delta and some Northern
E.S. Osabuohien / Land Use Policy 39 (2014) 155–165 161
Table  1
Summary statistics of variables in LALIs and Non-LALI communities in Nigeria.
Name Description All With LALIs Without LALIs
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Transpdum Presence of modern means
of transportation; yes = 1, 0
if otherwise
0.5459 0.4874 0.5333 0.5164 0.5426 0.4880
Nsas  Existence of NSAs; yes = 1,
0  if otherwise
0.2971 0.4575 0.4499 0.5071 0.2932 0.4558
Meetfreq If NSAs meet more than
twice a year = 1, 0 if
otherwise
0.2126 0.3961 0.3333 0.4499 0.2080 0.3938
Womenaces Women  access to land
tenure, yes = 1, 0 if
otherwise
0.3309 0.4567 0.2333 0.3716 0.3346 0.4595
Educ post Post primary education and
above = 1, 0 if otherwise
0.3937 0.4892 0.4667 0.5164 0.3910 0.4886
Area* Area of the community
(‘000 sq km)
1.201 1.413 1.911 2.825 1.174 1.330
Popu* Population of the
community (‘000 persons)
201.52 113.67 224.24 121.97 200.66 113.42
Density* Population density
(persons per sq km)
1043.00 3418.51 980.47 1480.77 1045.37 3471.62
Security  avg* Average annual number of
violent deaths
12.57 28.46 29.79 43.66 11.92 27.59
Rainfall* The amount of rainfall (in
mm)
215.48 85.55 235.00 49.17 214.95 86.32
Observations (no. of communities) 413 15 399
Source: Author’s computation
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cote: Only the means and standard deviation (S.D.) are presented. The mean valu
hich are only applicable for ‘All’ are 0.0362 and 0.1871, respectively.
* These are continuous variables.
tates where there is aggression on the issue of resource and polit-
cal power control. Another reason may  be that the attacks by Boko
aram were not rampant at the time the survey was  conducted.
In speciﬁcation C of Table 2 and C1 of Table A2, the amount of
ainfall had the expected positive sign and was also signiﬁcant. This
enotes that communities that have greater proportion of rainfall
ill be more likely to attract LALIs. It can also be understood from
he premise that communities with reasonable amount of rainfall
ill be more suitable for agricultural activities as it will suggest less
emand for alternative source of water.14
A skip to the another variable in Table 2 – the level of educa-
ional attainment implicate the fact that communities with better
nformation proxied educational level of their leaders (educ post)
ill be less likely to attract the LALIs. This is based on its negative
nd signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. Thus, in communities where the leaders
ave more educational attainment, there will be more awareness
n the issue of LALIs and such communities and will likely demand
ore (from the investors and State Governments); hence, the likeli-
ood that such communities will be targeted for LALIs will be lower,
eteris paribus
For the indicators of local institutions, only women access to
and had the expected negative sign. Others like the presence
nd activities of NSAs had positive signs but none of them was
igniﬁcant.15 This ﬁnding underscores that local institutions do not
lay inﬂuential role regarding LALIs. It may  not be far from the ‘real-
ties on the ground’ as in most cases the local institutions can be
hadowed by the State (Oya, 2013). This helps to suggest the need to
trengthen local institutions such as providing mechanisms where
14 This is interpreted with some element of caution as the variable was only avail-
ble at the State level not LGAs; however, within a State there is not much variation
n  vegetation covers.
15 Even when principal component index, PCA r was  done using principal compo-
ent analysis in the last Column of Tables 2 and A2, the non-signiﬁcance did not
hange. the means of the medians. The mean and S.D. for the dependent variable (LALIs),
the potential communities that LALIs is intending to occur can be
represented in the negotiation process right from the outset. Some
countries like Zambia and Uganda have started this with the for-
mation of the Zambian Land Alliance (http://www.zla.org.zm/) and
Ugandan Land Alliance (http://ulaug.org/). Such alliance can play
important roles in helping the local communities to be informed
of the intention of LALIs and how they can negotiate crucial
issues like compensations, resettlement and among others (Nolte,
2014).
In Nigeria, such organised mechanism is not yet in existence
apart from the farmers’ association whose leaders do not have sufﬁ-
cient knowledge of LALIs issues. Education of non-state actors (e.g.
NGOs) in this regard through the formation of system for issues
involving LALIs will be a right stem in the right direction towards
ensuring better outcomes from LALIs. Grain at the global level is
doing this in some bit but there is extent it can do given their
limited staff strengthen and coverage (Grain, 2013). The creation
of Nigeria’s Land Alliance (it can be another name what matters
is the activities) at National, State and LGAs will be essential in
ensuring that the LALIs occurrence does not lead to ’land grab’ but
portrayal of development opportunities just as government and
investors have often canvassed.
The results could also help to form a departure from the think-
ing that local institutions always resist the issue of LALIs, rather
from the positive sign it could play a supportive role if properly
nexused and integrated in the process of negotiation and consul-
tation regarding LALIs. Involving local institutions in LALIs will
foster stronger relationship and the issues of rancour and use of
forces from the government to suppress the voices of the commu-
nities will not be essential. In summary, appreciating and involving
local institutions will be essential in the transformation of the
agricultural sector for productivity and progress of the developing
counties within the purview of LALIs.
Some robustness checks were carried out as reported in Table A3
(in the Appendix). This is to check if domestic cost of land and
labour play any signiﬁcant inﬂuence for LALIs in a community.
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Table 2
Results from probit regression in rural communities.
Variable Dependent variable: the likelihood of LALIs Occurring
A B C D E F G H
Transpdum 0.1609
(.687)
0.1681
(.677)
0.1283
(.794)
0.0486
(.902)
0.0034
(.993)
0.0124
(.976)
0.0302
(.944)
0.1505
(.711)
Area 0.2547a
(.004)
0.2635a
(.005)
0.1613
(.189)
0.2820a
(.010)
0.2876a
(.010)
0.3018a
(.006)
0.3493b
(.024)
0.3089a
(.002)
Popu  −0.0053a
(.003)
−0.0063a
(.009)
−0.0067a
(.091)
−0.007b
(.024)
−0.0071b
(.024)
−0.0071b
(.019)
−0.0083b
(.019)
−0.0072b
(.010)
Security avg 0.0108
(.110)
0.0216c
(.072)
0.0118
(.127)
0.0123
(.121)
0.0126
(.108)
0.0118
(.150)
0.0101
(.162)
Rainfall 0.0016b
(.058)
Nsa  0.3720
(.436)
Meetfreq 0.5677
(.261)
0.5520
(.266)
0.5739
(.267)
Womenaces −0.2876
(.395)
−0.2884
(.422)
Educ  post −0.6555b
(.015)
−0.6340b
(.019)
PCA r 0.0226
(.734)
Constant −1.6985a
(.000)
−1.658a
(.000)
−1.6901a
(.000)
−1.6404a
(.000)
−1.6425a
(.000)
−1.5627a
(.000)
−1.2942a
(.000)
−1.4176a
(.000)
Pseudo  R2 0.1507 0.1704 0.1078 0.1807 0.1922 0.1995 0.2304 0.2028
Log  pseudo likelihood −28.01 −27.36 −17.55 −27.02 −26.64 −26.40 −25.38 −26.29
Obs.  290 290 203 290 290 290 290 290
Source:  Author’s computation.
Notes: P-values are in parenthesis. Superscript a, b, and c denotes signiﬁcant at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. All the equations corrected for robust standard errors. Marginal effects were examined in all the speciﬁcations but not
reported for space. PCA r (an index for local institutions) was derived using principal component analysis by incorporating the ability of the community to determine independently the rule of access and use of its communal
resource and the recognition of communal resource to NSAs and meetfreq.
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he results in speciﬁcations I and II, reveal that domestic cost of
and and labour had negative sign denoting that communities with
oth lower cost of land and labour will attract LALIs but such ten-
ency was not signiﬁcant. In other words, both domestic cost of
and do not paly meaningful role on the likelihood of LALIs being
n a community. In addition, another functional form of the regres-
ions were made using the logarithmic transformation of the key
on-categorical variables (area and population) as well as their
ossible interactions with some local institutional variables (NSAs
nd Meetfreq) to examine if there could be signiﬁcant changes to
he results. As could be observed from the speciﬁcations III–VIII of
able A3, there was not noticeable changes to the pattern of the
ain results that were earlier reported in Table 2. The implication
f this is that the results do not have signiﬁcant functional bias and
s such are reliable.
ummary and conclusion
The study made efforts in unravelling how community char-
cteristics can inﬂuence the likelihood of receiving large-scale
gricultural land investments (LALIs) and the aspects of community
eatures that are vital. This is an important contribution to existing
iterature. It is particularly of interest as not much empirical evi-
ences have used Nigeria, one of the top 20 destinations of LALIs
lobally. In sum, the community characteristics that explain vari-
tion in the LALIs across the rural communities in Nigeria include
he size of the community (area), its population (and by extension,
opulation density), and educational level of the community lead-
rs as well as amount of rainfall accounting for vegetation cover.
actors like local cost of land and labour, infrastructure and secu-
ity situation do not play signiﬁcant role in affecting the likelihood
f LALIs being attracted to a community. In effect, it could be stated
hat communities with large area, low population, high amount of
ainfall and where the leaders have low educational attainment will
ore likely receive LALIs in Nigeria.
It is quite surprising to observe that the indicators of local insti-
utions in the communities do not exert signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
ikelihood of LALIs occurrence in Nigeria. This might be anchored
n the power relations involving LALIs where the force from the
tate as empowered by the Land Use Act and possibly working with
he potential investors can undermine local institutions within the
ommunities and thus the communities cannot but comply, at least
n the short-run. In this line of envisaging, formation of non-state
able A1
dditional summary statistics of other variables.*
Name Description All 
Mean [Obs.] S.D. 
Distance* Distance (km) of social
amenities from
community centre
17.74
[348]
29.41
Laborcost* The amount workers
are paid by acre† (‘000
naira)
3.906
[263]
3.617
Landcost* Cost of an acre† of land
(‘000 naira)
352.39
[249]
2128
ource: Author’s computation.
otes: Only the means and standard deviation (S.D.) are presented. The mean values are t
* These other continuous variables are only used as additional information and robus
issing values as reﬂected in their observations [Obs.].
† An acre of land is approximately 0.405 hectare. The average exchange rate of 1 USD to Nlicy 39 (2014) 155–165 163
actors to help educate, enlighten and work with local communities
is recommended. The Late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua made
efforts to set-up Presidential Technical Committee on Land Reform
(PTCLR) to review some of the clauses on the Land Use Act. However,
his demise (May 2010) and subsequent change of government has
not helped as the key recommendation from the Committee (trans-
forming it into a standing commission) is still awaiting debate at
the National Assembly.16
Issues for further research to complement this study include:
examining similar community-level characteristics in other African
countries that are also major recipients of LALIs to compare with
the results of this study. It will also be of interest to take a look
at the other LALIs in other States of Nigeria besides Kwara State
and do in-depth case study using qualitative data to complement
this quantitative data approach. This will help to investigate the
implications of LALIs in the communities and the households in
such communities.
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Mean [Obs.] S.D. Mean [Obs.] S.D.
 8.75
[8]
9.78 17.95
[340]
29.69
 3.670
[10]
3.391 3.916
[253]
3.632
.34 73.94
[8]
173.01 361.64
[241]
2162.70
he means of the medians.
tness check. The reason for this is that they are not the main focus and they had
aira was  150 between late 2010 and early 2011 when the LSMS ISA was conducted.
assistance. The views expressed are mine.
Appendix.
16 This was  conﬁrmed by a telephone interview with one of the members of the
PTCLR June, 2013.
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Table A2
Results from Probit Regression in Rural Communities (with Population Density).
Variable Dependent variable: the likelihood of LALIs occurring
A1 B1 C1 D1 E1 F1 G1 H1
Transpdum 0.1058 (.775) 0.1149 (.756) 0.0464 (.933) 0.0610 (.861) 0.0093 (.979) 0.0035 (.992) 0.0052 (.988) 0.1117 (.753)
Density −0.0035c(.098) −0.0035(.104) −0.0048(.160) −0.0037(.130) −0.0037(.121) −0.0039(.106) −0.0042c(.079) −0.0039c(.077)
Security avg 0.0074 (.245) 0.0188 (.105) 0.0076 (.253) 0.0079 (.243) 0.0083 (.219) 0.0073 (.274) 0.0064 (.321)
Rainfall 0.0048a (.007)
Ngo 0.1655 (.696)
Meetfreq 0.3693 (.401) 0.3508 (.414) 0.3248 (.446)
Womenaces −0.2287(.461) −0.1929 (.545)
Educ  post −0.3016 (.342) −0.3538 (.263)
PCA r 0.0181 (.814)
Constant −1.699a (.000) −1.518a (.000) −2.433a (.000) −1.518a (.000) −1.524a (.000) −1.404a (.000) −1.257a (.000) −1.336a (.000)
Pseudo R2 0.0928 0.1028 0.1748 0.1050 0.1128 0.1183 0.1276 −29.156
Log  pseudo
likelihood
−29.92 −29.59 −16.23 −29.52 −29.26 −29.08 −28.77 −29.00
Obs  290 290 203 290 290 290 290 290
Notes and source:  Same as in Table 2.
Table A3
Additional regression results for robustness checks.
Variable Dependent variable: the likelihood of LALIs occurring
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Transpdum 0.1912
(.740)
0.1788
(.745)
0.1765
(.651)
0.1746
(.649)
0.0468
(.908)
0.0174
(.966)
0.0373
(.930)
0.0054
(.990)
Area 0.4441a
(.000)
0.3329a
(.004)
0.3276a
(.003)
0.3230a
(.003)
0.3332a
(.002)
0.3304a
(.002)
Popu  −0.0119a
(.001)
−0.0050b
(.014)
−0.0080b
(.013)
−0.0077b
(.012)
−0.0066b
(.020)
−0.0063b
(.026)
Lnarea 0.5223b
(.033)
0.6200b
(.016)
Lnpopu −0.6576b
(.044)
−0.7399b
(.048)
Security avg 0.0085
(.195)
0.0074
(.284)
Educ post −0.7180b
(.031)
−0.4810c
(.063)
−0.5153c
(.066)
−0.6900b
(.014)
−0.6708b
(.013)
−0.6900b
(.014)
−0.6914b
(.013)
Landcost −0.0057
(.450)
Laborcost −0.0094
(.901)
Pca r 0.0033
(.965)
Meetfreq 0.0011
(.998)
1.0400
(.153)
Womenaces −0.2524
(.501)
−0.2866
(.455)
−0.2276
(.542)
−0.2547
(.496)
Nsas −0.0189
(.970)
0.8557
(.194)
Area * meetfreq 0.4113
(0.1110)
Area  * nsa 0.2869
(.195)
Popu * meefreq −0.0034
(0.3890)
Popu * nsa −0.0033
(0.3020)
Pseudo R2 0.3785 0.2123 0.1277 0.1519 0.2257 0.2123 0.2119 0.2032
Log  Pseudo
Likelihood
−12.070 −18.084 −28.772 −27.973 −25.538 −25.982 −25.993 −26.280
Obs.  191 191 290 290 290 290 290 290
Source: Author’s computation.
Note: In all the equations the constant term was included but not reported for space. Distance was not included since transdum is in the estimation for infrastructure. P-values
are  in parenthesis. Superscripts a, b, and c denote signiﬁcant at 1,5 and 10% respectively. All the equations corrected for robust standard errors. Marginal effects were examined
in  all the speciﬁcations but not reported for space. Other robustness checks like the squares of area and population were examined but not much difference was observed;
and  hence, not reported.
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